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COMMENTS
CATEGORICAL VS. GAME-SPECIFIC: ADOPTING
THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETING
"PERMITS SUCH GAMING"
I. INTRODUCTION
People love to gamble. Indian tribes have capitalized on this love, offering gaming
to better their economies. In fact, Indian gaming generated $25.1 billion in 2006,
doubling the revenue generated in 2001.1 While Indian gaming has recently exploded in
popularity (and unpopularity) over the past two to three decades, Indian gaming is
nothing new.2  Prior to colonization of the Americas, Indian tribes used gaming in
settlement disputes, in entertainment, in making a profit, and in certain ceremonies.
3
Today, Indians still game for many of the same reasons.4  However, gaming is not
without controversy, especially when two sovereigns, the Tribe and the State, differ on
what types of gaming should be allowed.5 In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA), which sets guidelines for how tribes are allowed to operate their
gaming facilities. 6 Currently, Indian gaming occurs in twenty-eight of the fifty states.
7
The enactment of the IGRA resulted in a great deal of litigation to interpret the
meaning of the IGRA's sections. 8 This article addresses 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), the
1. Natil. Indian Gaming Comnm., NIGC Announces 2006 Indian Gaming Revenues, http://www.nigc.gov/
ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PR63062007/PR63072007/tabid/784/Default.aspx (June 4, 2007).
2. See e.g. G. William Rice, Tribal Governmental Gaming Law 3 (Carolina Academic Press 2006); Susan
Aucoin, Traditional Indian Games and Toys, http://www.avcnet.org/ne-do-ba/mcgam0l.html (Dec. 2001);
Tara Prindle, Native American Technology & Art: Bowl & Dice Game, http://www.nativetech.org/games/
bowl&dice.html (accessed Mar. 18, 2008); see also Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 2 (Aug. 3, 1988) (reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3072) ("The Seminole Tribe of Florida in 1979 was the first tribe to enter the bingo
industry.").
3. Rice, supra n. 2, at 3.
4. Id.
5. See generally id.
6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000). The guidelines determine where gaming is allowed, what types of
gaming are allowed, who is allowed to conduct the gaming, how the process is to take effect, who governs the
gaming, and even why gaming is allowed. Id.
7. Rice, supra n. 2, at xvii-xx (States offering some form of Indian gaming: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
8. See e.g. Chickasaw Nation v. US., 534 U.S. 84, 88-95 (2001) (discussing different canons of statutory
1
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IGRA section stating "[c]lass III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are.., located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity." 9 This article primarily focuses on the phrase "permits
such gaming" because a circuit split currently exists on the proper interpretation of
"permits such gaming. ' 1° The circuit courts interpret this provision in two different
ways. 
1 1
One approach of interpreting the phrase is to take a "game-specific" approach.
12
Using the "game-specific" approach, the only way the tribe can offer a certain class III
game is if the state expressly allows that game "for any purpose." 13 For example, if a
tribe wants to offer roulette, ordinarily a class III game, the state must expressly allow
some organization to offer roulette for any purpose. 14 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits
adopt the "game-specific" approach. 
1 5
The other way to interpret the phrase is to take a "categorical" approach. 16 This
means the tribe can offer a certain game if a state offers any other game classified as
class III "for any purpose." 17 Under this interpretation, if a tribe wants to offer roulette,
a class III game, it must only ensure the state offers some other game considered a class
III game such as poker or pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing. 18 The Second Circuit
adopts the "categorical" approach. 19
This paper argues the proper interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)'s
"permits such gaming" is the "categorical" approach, which is consistent with the plain
meaning of the statute and conforms more to the legislative intent. In addition, using the
"categorical" approach to interpret this section comports with the canon of Indian law
construction that provides for resolution favoring the Tribe when there is ambiguity in a
statute. Finally, this approach allows for more tribal autonomy, which is in line with one
of the stated purposes of enacting the IGRA--"to provide a statutory basis for the
interpretation); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that a section of the IGRA was
unconstitutional); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030, 1035 (1 1th Cir.
1995) (interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(e)).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
10. See e.g. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyo., 389 F.3d 1308, 1310-11 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit split
on how to interpret "permits such gaming").
11. See id.
12. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. S.D., 3 F.3d 273, 278-80 (8th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe 11]; Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1255-59 (9th Cir.
1994).
13. N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311.
14. See id. Usually the purpose for which the state allows the gaming relates to fund-raising for charities.
See e.g. Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205 (1987) [hereinafter Cabazon 11] ("[The
California] statute does not entirely prohibit the playing of bingo but permits it when the games are operated
and staffed by members of designated charitable organizations."); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyo., 429 F.3d 934, 935
(10th Cir. 2005) (Counsel for the State responded that "[casino-style gaming] can be done for charitable
purposes [under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-7-102(b) and 6-7-108(a)(viii)] if people come together... in a bona fide
social relationship.").
15. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe I, 3 F.3d at 278-79; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257-58.
16. See e.g. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 913 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe I1]; Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wis., 770 F.
Supp. 480, 488 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
17. N. Arapaho, 389 F.3dat 1311.
18. See id.
19. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1031-32.
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operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."20
Part II of this paper lays the foundation for the enactment of the IGRA and
describes the relevant case law that has interpreted "permits such gaming." Part III of
this paper analyzes the different approaches taken with an emphasis on the "categorical"
approach as the correct approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Public Law No. 83-28021
Indian tribes enjoy many elements of sovereignty in which they retain "attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." 22  However, this tribal
sovereignty depends on, and is subordinate to, the federal government. 2 3 While a tribe's
sovereignty is usually not subordinate to state governments, Congress, exercising its
plenary power over the tribes, may expressly provide that a state apply its own laws on
24 25tribal reservation land. Prior to the enactment of the IGRA, states attempted to apply
their own laws concerning gaming on tribal lands through the authority of Public Law
No. 83-280. 26 This provision grants states full authority over criminal matters, but only
limited authority over civil matters.
27
Prior to the enactment of Public Law 280, there were no means for the state or
federal government or for many tribes to provide for punishment of crimes committed on
many Indian reservations. 28 A state could not exercise its jurisdiction over tribal lands
and provide for punishment of crimes through its legal system, but many tribes did not
have their own legal system to rely on for justice. 29 Thus, Congress enacted Public Law
280 to grant the states jurisdiction over tribal lands to help prevent unpunished crime by
insuring there was an existing system in position to prosecute criminals and also to
provide a forum for civil matters.
30
20. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (emphasis added).
21. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 589 (1953) (Public Law 280). This Act "granted jurisdiction over some or
all of the Indian country within the state[s]" of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin; "[o]ther states were given Congressional approval to unilaterally extend state jurisdiction over
Indian country within their state." Rice, supra n. 2, at xlv.
22. US.v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
23. See Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
24. McClanahan v. St. Tax Commn. ofAriz., 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (quoting U.S. Dept. Int., Federal
Indian Law 845 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1958)); see also U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 5
(reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians § 33 (2005).
25. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
26. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 589. Some parts of Public Law 280 are still codified in various sections of
the United States Code. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000). From the 1950s through
the 1970s, Public Law 280 was construed in a way destructive to the tribe's self-determination and tribal
government. Rice, supra n. 2, at xlv. This Act provided for a policy that led to the "Termination Era,"
whereby tribes lost their federal recognition as a tribe, and its members lost their recognition as Indians. Id.
27. Compare e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (criminal) with 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (civil).
28. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 745 (E.D. Wash. 1985) ("The states needed
Congressional authorization to exert power over Indians.").
29. See e.g. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1978).
30. Bryan v. Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1976) (quoting H.R. Rpt. 83-848 at 5-6 (Aug. 15, 1953)
2007]
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Because Public Law 280 distinguishes between criminal and civil matters,
litigation ensued to determine what constitutes a criminal matter and what constitutes a
civil matter. 31 For example, in Bryan v. Itasca County,32 the Supreme Court held the
central focus of Public Law 280 was to confer on the states "criminal jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians on the reservations" 33 and "to grant jurisdiction
over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court." 34 Thus, when a
state wishes to exercise jurisdiction under the authority of Public Law 280 and enforce
state law on an Indian reservation, but the tribe balks at the enforcement, the court must
determine whether the law is criminal or civil in nature.35 If the court determines the
law is criminal in nature, Public Law 28036 fully applies, and state authority trumps
tribal authority.3 7 However, if the law is civil in nature, Public Law 28038 only applies
to provide a forum in state court and does not grant the State general civil regulatory
authority. 39 Therefore, when the state wants to exercise jurisdiction under the authority
of Public Law 280 to enforce state laws pertaining to gaming on an Indian reservation, it
is crucial for the state that the court find the law to be prohibitory in nature.
40
When tribes began to operate gaming facilities, states used Public Law 280 to
exercise jurisdiction on tribal lands to attempt to regulate matters concerned with
gaming.4 1 The issue in these situations centered on whether the gaming the tribe was
attempting to offer was criminal or civil in nature. 42  The differentiation between
criminal and civil matters and the amount of authority a state possesses regarding the
matter resulted in litigation to clarify what constitutes a criminal matter and what
constitutes a civil matter.43 If the gaming constituted a criminal offense, states could
exercise their authority to the fullest and prohibit the gaming from taking place.
4 4
However, if the gaming constituted a civil matter, states were not able to exercise their
authority and the gaming could take place. 45  In 1987, the Supreme Court decided
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,46 a monumental case that distinguishes
and Sen. Rpt. 83-699 (Aug. 15, 1953) (both reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409)); see also Yakima Indian
Nation, 617 F. Supp. at 745; Vanessa J. Jimdnez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction
under Public Law 280, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1659 (1998).
31. See e.g. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311-16 (5th Cir. 1981) (using the
civil/regulatory and criminal/prohibitory distinction for the first time with respect to Indian gaming); see also
Cabazon 11, 480 U.S. at 207-12; Bryan, 426 U.S. at 377-87 (using distinction with respect to property taxation
on reservation lands).
32. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
33. Id. at 380.
34. Id. at 385.
35. Cabazon II, 480 U.S. at 208.
36. Section 2 of Public Law 280 concerned criminal matters and was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
37. Cabazon II, 480 U.S. at 208.
38. Section 4 of Public Law 280 concerned civil matters and was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360.
39. Cabazon 11, 480 U.S. at 207-08.
40. See e.g. Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th
Cir. 1982).
41. See e.g. Cabazon 11, 480 U.S. at 207-12; Bryan, 426 U.S. at 377-87; Barona Group, 694 F.2d at 1187.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 480 U.S. 202.
[Vol. 43:89
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between a state's criminal/prohibitory laws and the state's civil/regulatory laws. 47
B. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
48
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Cabazon and Morongo
Bands of Mission Indians brought suit against the State of California seeking a
declaratory judgment that the State cannot apply California law in Indian country and an
injunction to keep the State from doing so.49 Both tribes were conducting bingo games
on their reservations, and both tribes encouraged non-Indians to participate in this
gaming. 50  The Cabazon Band, in addition to bingo, was operating a card club that
offered a variety of card games, including draw poker.5 1 These operations provided for
employment of tribal members and profits as the sole source of income for the tribes. 52
The law California sought to enforce did not prohibit the playing of bingo, but it
did impose such regulations concerning who could operate the games, who could work at
the games, what to do with the profits, and how much the prizes could be worth.53 In
violation of this statute, the tribes were operating the games, 54 employing and paying
tribal members a wage to staff the operations, and not limiting the jackpots. 55
In order for California to be able to apply its own law on the lands of the Cabazon
and Morongo Bands, the State alleged Congress granted the authority to do so through
Public Law 280. 56 The Ninth Circuit rejected this proposition, 57 and the Supreme Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that California's law was "regulatory" in nature
rather than "prohibitory." 58 In Cabazon II, the Supreme Court applied the test the Ninth
Circuit formulated in Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v.
Duffy59 to conclude California's law was civil/regulatory in nature:
47. Id. at 208-09.
48. 480 U.S. 202.
49. Id. at 204-06. The law the State was trying to apply was Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp.
1987), which concerned bingo games. Id. at 205. Additionally, Riverside County was trying to apply local
Ordinances Nos. 558 and 331, which regulated bingo and prohibited the playing of draw poker and other card
games, respectively. Id. at 206.
50. Id. at 205 (In fact, the games were played predominantly by non-Indians.).
51. Cabazonll, 480 U.S. at 205.
52. Id.
53. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 326.5; Cabazon 11, 480 U.S. at 205. The regulations provided that charitable
organizations could conduct bingo games and only members volunteering their time could work at the games.
Additionally, the regulations specified that the organization must keep the profits in special account and/or use
the profits for charitable purposes. Finally, the regulations dictated that a prize's maximum value could not
exceed $250. Id.
54. In its merits brief, the State contested that the tribes were among the authorized charitable
organizations, but at oral argument, the State allowed that the tribes were among these authorized charitable
organizations. Cabazon 11, 480 U.S.at 205-06 n. 3.
55. Id. at 205.
56. Id. at 207. California cited to Public Law 280 as amended and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28
U.S.C. § 1360.
57. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside Co., 783 F.2d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Cabazon 1].
58. Cabazon I, 480 U.S. at 210.
59. 694 F.2d 1185. In this case, the Ninth Circuit determined that California's laws with respect to bingo
were regulatory and of a civil nature. The factors the court considered were: (1) California law authorizes a
number of organizations to operate bingo as a money-making venture, (2) bingo was not contrary to the public
policy of California law, (3) the policy that ambiguities in statutes are to be construed in the Indians' favor, and
2007]
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[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within [Public
Law] 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct
at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and [Public Law] 280
does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether
the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.
60
Because California's public policy allowed for the playing of bingo and other games, the
law restricting the gaming was regulatory in nature. 61 Thus, Public Law 280 did not
grant California the requisite authority to apply its laws on tribal lands.
6 2
C. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
6 3
Following the Cabazon II decision, states and local governments began to "urg[e]
Congress to enact legislation to regulate Indian gaming for the (unexpressed) purpose of
protecting existing state businesses that engaged in gaming operations and the
(expressed) purpose of reducing the influence of organized crime on Indian gaming."
64
Congress listened to the states' and local governments' concerns, and they also
considered the interests of Indian tribes in finally enacting the IGRA on October 17,
1988.65
The first section of the IGRA announces Congress's findings.66  The second
(4) the purpose of the operation was to raise money for the Barona Tribe "to promote the health, education and
general welfare." Id. at 1189-90.
60. Cabazon 11, 480 U.S. at 209.
61. Id. at 210-11.
62. Id at210.
63. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
64. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 39, 50 (2007) (citing
134 Cong. Rec. H5028-07 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Udall)); Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand,
Indian Gaming and Tribal Sovereignty: The Casino Compromise 42 (U. Press Kansas 2005); Brad Jolly, The
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of Termination Continues, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 273, 297
(1997); Robert B. Porter, Indian Gaming Regulation: A Case Study in Neo-Colonialism, 5 Gaming L. Rev. 299,
306 (2001); Mark C. Wenzel, Let the Chips Fall Where They May: The Spokane Indian Tribe's Decision to
Proceed with Casino Gambling without a State Compact, 30 Gonz. L. Rev. 467, 475 (1994-1995); see also
Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Wash., 28 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721); see also Sen.
Rpt. 100-446 at 5 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 states:
The Congress finds that-
(1) numerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or have licensed gaming activities on Indian
lands as a means of generating tribal governmental revenue;
(2) Federal courts have held that section 81 of this title requires Secretarial review of management
contracts dealing with Indian gaming, but does not provide standards for approval of such contracts;
(3) existing Federal law does not provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming
on Indian lands;
(4) a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal government; and
(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming
activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not,
as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.
[Vol. 43:89
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section states the three purposes of the IGRA. 67 The first purpose of the IGRA is "to
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments. ' 6 8  The other two purposes address the states' and local governments
concerns and other tribal interests. 69 The third section of the IGRA defines three classes
of Indian gaming. 70 In addition to defining the types of games each class encompasses,
this section of the IGRA sets forth the jurisdiction and regulations to which each class is
subject.71
Class I gaming includes social games and traditional forms of Indian gaming
played for low stakes. 72 These games usually take place in connection with ceremonies
or celebrations. 73  One example of this type of gaming is "Wa'lade hama'gan" or
"hubbub," a bowl and dice game played by the Penobscot tribe.74 While individuals and
villages wagered money on the gaming, the game was important for demonstrating
"[e]lements of reciprocal exchange." 75  The IGRA states each tribe regulates its own
class I gaming.76 The state cannot regulate a tribe's class I gaming activities. 77 In other
words, tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over class I or traditional gaming.
78
Class II gaming includes bingo, pull-tabs, lotteries, punch boards, tip jars, instant
bingo, "other games similar to bingo,"79 non-banking card games, and certain
67. Id. at § 2702 states:
The purpose of this chapter is-
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it
from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by
both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on
Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the
establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional
concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.
Id.
68. Id. at § 2702(1).
69. Id. at § 2702(2)-(3).
70. Id. at § 2703.
71. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a),(b), & (d).
72. Id. at § 2703(6) ("The term 'class I gaming' means social games solely for prizes of minimal value or
traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal
ceremonies or celebrations.").
73. Id.
74. Prindle, supra n. 1 (describing how to play and the object of the game as well as the history and culture
surrounding the game).
75. Id. In addition to money, individuals and villages would also bet with "[a]nimal skins and furs, kettles,
knives, axes[,]... [and] stores of strung wampum." Id.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) ("Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter.").
77. Id.
78. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 7 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3077).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i).
80. In "banking" games, "instead of all the players competing against each other, there is one player, the
banker [the casino], who competes against each of the other players individually. Often the banker has a slight
2007]
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"grandfathered" card games. 8 1 The IGRA also specifically excludes "any banking card
games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack" from class II gaming. 82  The
IGRA states tribes retain jurisdiction over class II gaming, subject to the ordinance
approval and licensing regulations of the National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC). 3 While the tribe is not the sole regulator as it is with class I gaming, the state
cannot regulate a tribe's class II gaming activities.
84
Finally, Congress defined class III gaming to include all other types of gaming.85
One associates class III games with casino-style gaming as class III games include slot
machines, poker, blackjack, craps, keno, etc.86 These types of games are potentially the
most profitable for the tribe.87 They are also the games the states most want to regulate
and tax.88 The IGRA created a compromise between the tribe's and state's interest on
the regulation of class III gaming. 8 9 The IGRA states a tribal-state compact regulates
class III gaming. 90 This compact results from the negotiations between the Indian tribe
and the State.9 1 Congress implemented such a scheme to address the concerns of both
the states and the tribes. 92  The states, as sovereigns, want to protect their laws and
regulations, but the tribes, as sovereigns, want to keep the states from exercising
jurisdiction on their lands. 93 Thus, before a tribe can conduct class III gaming under the
built-in advantage over the other players." John McLeod, Card Games: Banking Games,
http://www.pagat.com/banking (last updated Mar. 23, 2007). Common banking games are blackjack, roulette,
craps, etc. Id.
81. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(C). The games grandfathered into class II gaming are operated by tribes in
Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington. See id. at § 2701(7)(C)-(F).
82. Id. at § 2703(7)(B)(i).
83. Id. at § 2710(b); see also id. at §§ 2704-2708, 2710(c); Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 7 (reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3077).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b).
85. Id. at § 2703(8) ("The term 'class III gaming' means all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or
class II gaming.").
86. See Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., Game Classification Opinions, http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoon/
GameClassificationOpinions/tabid/789/Default.aspx (accessed Mar. 18, 2008) (listing different games and
designating them as either class II or class III).
87. See Fletcher, supra n. 64, at 52; Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 Or. L. Rev. 893, 949
(2000); Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., supra n. 1 ("Phil Hogen, Chairman of the National Indian Gaming
Commission (NIGC), announced today during the United South and Eastern Tribes (USET) semi-annual
meeting that net revenues from Indian gaming grew more than 11% from 2005 to 2006, generating $25.1
billion in gaming revenues in 2006."); see also Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, "Indian Gaming,"
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt4.html (accessed Mar. 18, 2008) (calling Indian gaming the "new
buffalo" because Indian gaming "is a single source capable of feeding and clothing the Indians. It has become
the one economic development program that has been able to overcome the poor quality and remote location of
most of their lands.").
88. See Dunstan, supra n. 87.
89. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 13 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
91. Id. at § 2710(d)(3).
92. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 13 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083) ("[T]he use of compacts between
tribes and states is the best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect
to the regulation of complex gaming enterprises.... [T]he compact process is a viable mechanism for setting
[sic] various matters between two equal sovereigns."); see also Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 481-
82.
93. See Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 13 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083). See also Lac du Flambeau
Band, 770 F. Supp. at 481-82.
[Vol. 43:89
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss1/6
CATEGORICAL VS. GAME-SPECIFIC
IGRA, the tribe and the state must negotiate a tribal-state compact.
94
D. Interpreting "Permits Such Gaming"
In addition to negotiating a tribal-state compact, there are two other requirements a
tribe must comply with in order to engage in class III gaming.95 The Indian tribe must
first adopt an ordinance or resolution that comports with the requirements of 25 U.S.C. §
2710(b) and is approved by the NIGC's chairman.9 6 Additionally, the planned gaming
must be "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity." 97  As mentioned above, it is with the phrase "permits such
gaming" that this article is primarily concerned.
Three circuit courts have addressed this issue. 98 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have taken a "game-specific" approach in interpreting "permits such gaming." 99 The
Second Circuit has taken a "categorical" approach in interpreting the phrase. 10 0 In
Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 10 1 the Tenth Circuit declined to choose either
approach, deciding the case on other merits. 102 However, in deciding the case, the court
did quote from Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut (Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
1/) 103 which adopted the "categorical" approach, giving at least one analyst hope that
should the Tenth Circuit need to decide this issue, it would also adopt the "categorical"
approach. 1
04
The Second Circuit adopted the "categorical" approach in Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe 11.105 In that case, the Indian tribe wanted to engage in class III gaming and
requested Connecticut to enter into negotiations with them in order to form a tribal-state
compact. 106 However, the State refused to negotiate because it felt its obligation to
negotiate did not arise until the Tribe adopted a tribal ordinance approved by the
NIGC. 10 7 The court rejected Connecticut's contention.
108
Connecticut law provided for the playing of a number of class III games, though
only for limited occasions. 1° 9 Certain non-profit organizations could offer "blackjack,
94. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
95. See id. at § 2710(d)(I)(A)-(C).
96. Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(A).
97. Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
98. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 1I, 913 F.2d at 1031-32; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 1I, 3 F.3d at 278-
80; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1255-59.
99. See e.g. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278-79; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257-
58.
100. See e.g. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe H, 913 F.2d at 1031-32.
101. 389F.3d 1308.
102. Id. at 1311.
103. Id. at 1312 (quoting from Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 1!, 913 F.2d at 1031).
104. That analyst is Professor G. William Rice, co-director of the Native American Law Center and
Associate Professor of Law at The University of Tulsa College of Law. He is also the author of the casebook,
Tribal Governmental Gaming Law.
105. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
106. Id. at 1025.
107. Id. at 1025, 1028.
108. Id. at 1028.
109. Id. at 1026.
2007]
9
Taylor: Categorical Vs. Game-Specific: Adopting the Categorical Approach
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
TULSA LAW REVIEW
poker, dice, money-wheels, roulette, baccarat, chuck-a-luck, pan game, over and under,
horse race games, acey-ducey, beat the dealer, and bouncing ball" on "Las Vegas nights"
for fund-raising purposes. 1 0 The State set limitations on the operation of "Las Vegas
nights" concerning who could conduct "Las Vegas nights," how much could be wagered
or paid out, and how often "Las Vegas nights" could be offered, among other criteria.
11 l
In accordance with the IGRA,112 the tribe waited 180 days to file suit against
Connecticut and its governor to seek "an order directing the State to conclude within
sixty days a tribal-state compact.., and appointing a mediator to resolve any
impasse."' 113  Additionally, the tribe sought "a declaratory judgment that the IGRA
obliges the State to negotiate in good faith with the Tribe regarding the conduct of
gaming activities on the Reservation."' 114 The district court granted the tribe summary
judgment.115 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. 116
In opposition, Connecticut argued the limited consent needed for non-profit
organizations to operate "Las Vegas nights" for fund-raising purposes "does not amount
to a general allowance of 'such [casino-type] gaming,' within the contemplation of
section 2710(d)(1)(B), as the Tribe would institute." 117 The State further argued this
type of "gaming activity is contrary to [Connecticut's] public policy." 118 In opposition,
the tribe argued Connecticut's statute allows for "[a]ny nonprofit organization,
association or corporation" to conduct "Las Vegas nights." 119  Therefore, although
Connecticut set limitations on this type of gaming, the state law permits class III gaming
for some purpose.
120
The Second Circuit first looked to the IGRA's section concerning congressional
findings, 25 U.S.C. § 2701.121 Specifically, the court noted that in § 2701(5), Congress
set forth the finding that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal
law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and
public policy, prohibit such gaming activity."
' 122
The Second Circuit then turned to the Senate Report accompanying the enactment
of the IGRA, which approves of the Cabazon II distinction between criminal laws
prohibiting an activity and civil laws regulating an activity to determine a State's public
110. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe l, 913 F.2d at 1026 n. 5 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-186k-15 (1988)).
111. Id. at 1029.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
113. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1025. The tribe sought the order pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(iv). Id.
114. Id.
115. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 737 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Conn. 1990) [hereinafter Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe 1].
116. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, 913 F.2d at 1025.
117. Id. at 1029.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-186a to 7-186p (1989)).
120. Id.
121. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe H, 913 F.2d at 1029.
122. Id. at 1029 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) and noting that this finding is consistent with the ruling in
Cabazon 11).
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policy. 123 The court notes that this Senate Report "specifically adopted the Cabazon [I1]
rationale as interpretive of the requirement in section 2710(b)(1)(A) that class II gaming
be 'located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization or entity."'
' 124
Although the Senate Report deals with the interpretation of section 2710(b)(1)(A)
that regulates class II gaming, the Second Circuit found the Senate Report instructive for
determining the interpretation of section 2710(d)(1)(B) which regulates class III
gaming. 125  The court found it instructive because sections 2710(b)(1)(A) and
2710(d)(1)(B) have nearly identical language. 
12 6
Section 2710(b)(1)(A) states that class II gaming is allowed on Indian lands if
"such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose
by any person, organization or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise specifically
prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law)." 127 Section 2710(d)(1)(B) states class III
gaming is allowed on Indian lands if "such activities are ... located in a State that
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity."12 8 The
Second Circuit notes that a principle of statutory construction dictates "that '[w]hen the
same word or phrase is used in the same section of an act more than once, and the
meaning is clear as used in one place, it will be construed to have the same meaning in
the next place."' 129 Thus, the Second Circuit determined whether the tribe could offer
casino-style gaming on its reservation turned on a Cabazon II analysis of Connecticut's
public policy.
130
The Second Circuit rejects the State's approach which would apply "the full corpus
of state laws and regulations with regard to gambling" 13 1 to tribal gaming, concluding it
would nullify the "compact process that Congress established as the centerpiece of the
IGRA's regulation of class III gaming." 132 The Senate Report indicates the compacting
process was a compromise considering the sovereignty of both the State and the tribe,
but the compacting process does not strip the tribe of its sovereignty. 133 The Senate
Report states,
[a]fter lengthy hearings, negotiations and discussions, the Committee concluded that the
use of compacts between tribes and states is the best mechanism to assure that the interests
of both sovereign entities are met with respect to the regulation of complex gaming
enterprises such as pari-mutuel horse and dog racing, casino gaming, jai alai and so forth.
123. Id. (quoting Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076); citing U.S. v. Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 365 (8th Cir. 1990)).
124. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A)) (referencing Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 6 (reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076)).
125. Id. at 1030.
126. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe H, 913 F.2d at 1030.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
129. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting U.S. v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir.
1978)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1031.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1030 (citing Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 13 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083)).
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The Committee notes the strong concerns of states that state laws and regulations relating
to sophisticated forms of class III gaming be respected on Indian lands where, with few
exceptions, such laws and regulations do not now apply. The Committee balanced these
concerns against the strong tribal opposition to any imposition of State jurisdiction over
activities on Indian lands. The Committee concluded that the compact process is a viable
mechanism for setting [sic] various matters between two equal sovereigns. 34
Thus, the court concludes a tribe is not "subject to the entire body of State law on
gaming" just because it must create a compact with the State. 13 5 Instead, to offer class
III gaming, the tribe must only comply with the public policy of the State in accordance
with a Cabazon II analysis.1
36
The Second Circuit approved of the district court's conclusion that such gaming
did not violate the State's public policy because Connecticut allows games of chance for
fund-raising purposes and permits other types of statewide gambling; 137 thus, class III
gaming must not be "totally repugnant to the State's public policy. ' 138  Thus,
Connecticut regulates rather than prohibits class III gaming, so it must enter into good
faith negotiations with the tribe in order to form a compact to regulate class III gaming
on tribal lands. 139 To arrive at this result, the Second Circuit adopted the "categorical"
approach to interpret "permits such gaming."140
Although the Second Circuit has been the only federal court of appeals to adopt the
"categorical" approach, some other circuits' district courts interpreting 25 U.S.C. §
271 0(d)(1)(B) have also adopted the "categorical" approach. 14 1 In fact, the "categorical"
approach is also sometimes called the "Wisconsin" analysis 14 2 because of the decision
announced in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin. 14 3 This case was decided after the Second Circuit announced its judgment in
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, and the decision in Lac du Flambeau Band deals more
directly with the question of whether a State may refuse to negotiate on a particular game
if the State does not permit that particular game to take place. 144 The district court in
Lac du Flambeau Band answered that question in the negative. 145
134. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1030.
135. Id. at 1031 (quoting Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 366 n. 10).
136. Id.
137. The other types of gambling Connecticut permits are a state-operated lottery, bingo, jai alai, and pari-
mutuel betting. Id. at 1031.
138. Id.
139. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1032.
140. Id. at 1029-32.
141. See e.g. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Tex., 852 F. Supp. 587, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Lac du Flambeau
Band, 770 F. Supp. at 488; see also Dalton v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (N.Y. 2005) (a state's highest
court interpreting the issue). The New York Court of Appeals considered the issue when "a group of citizen
taxpayers, state legislators, and not-for-profit organizations 'opposed to the spread of gambling' brought suit
against New York's governor seeking to have certain provisions of New York's law governing gaming be
declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1185. The court rejected the argument, adopting the "categorical" approach to
determine the issue. Id. at 1189.
142. N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311.
143. 770 F. Supp. 480. Wisconsin is part of the Seventh Circuit whose court of appeals has not issued an
opinion adopting the "categorical" or "game-specific" approach.
144. Id. at 482.
145. Id. at 488.
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The Lac du Flambeau Tribe of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and the Sokaogon
Chippewa Community brought suit to determine whether it was necessary for Wisconsin
to negotiate with the tribe concerning certain types of games in forming the compact to
allow class III gaming. 146 The class III gaming activities the tribes wanted to include in
the compact consisted of "'Black Jack 21-cards, Cards, Video/Slots, games such as
Black-Jack and Poker, Craps, Roulette, Keno, off track betting parlor, [and] Sports
book.' 14 7 However, the State determined the only class III gaming Wisconsin allowed
is "lotteries and on-track parimutuel wagering," and the State refused to negotiate on any
other class III gaming.
148
The State argued it negotiated in good faith since the other types of class III
gaming the tribes sought to include in the compact "are not permitted for any purpose by
any person, organization or entity within Wisconsin [and] because they are not, the state
is not required to bargain over these games."' 14 9  The State focused on the word
"permits" in the language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) in its argument. 150 The State
argued the word "permits" as used in § 2710(d)(1)(B) ought to be read as "grant[s]
leave." 15 1 Thus, under Wisconsin's approach, "unless a state grants leave expressly for
the playing of a particular type of gaming activity within the state, that activity cannot be
lawful on Indian lands," 152 and the state is under no obligation to negotiate with regards
to that "particular type of gaming activity.' 153 The court disagreed with the State,
pointing out "permits" has more than one meaning.
154
For example, the court pointed out the State's definition ignores the
prohibitory/regulatory distinction set out in Cabazon 11.155 The court reasoned because
Congress relied on the Cabazon II decision in drafting the IGRA, that distinction is
essential in interpreting the meaning of the IGRA. 156  Thus, if Wisconsin's policy
"permits" some class III gaming, the State merely regulates the activity rather than
prohibits it. 157 Because Wisconsin permits some class III gaming in the form of lotteries
or pari-mutuel wagering, its policy is to regulate class III gaming. 15 8 The district court
concluded that
[i]t was not Congress's intent that the states would be able to impose their gaming
regulatory schemes on the tribes. The Act's drafters intended to leave it to the sovereign
146. Id. at481.
147. Id. at 483.
148. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 483.
149. Id. at 484.
150. Id. (The language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) is "[c]lass III gaming activities shall be lawful on
Indian lands only if such activities are.., located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity.").
151. Id. at484-85.
152. Id.
153. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
154. Id. (quoting the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary defining "permits" as "[t]o suffer, allow,
consent, let; to give leave or license; to acquiesce by failure to prevent, or to expressly assent or agree to the
doing of an act").
155. Id. at 485.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
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state and tribal governments to negotiate the specific gaming activities involving prize,
chance and consideration that each tribe will offer under the terms of its tribal state
compact. 
159
The court held because Wisconsin "does not, as a matter of criminal law and public
policy, prohibit such gaming activity" 160 and proffers "a state policy toward gaming that
is now regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature," 16 1 the State is required to negotiate
with the tribes on games the tribes want to include which are not expressly prohibited by
state law.
162
To summarize, the Second Circuit used the language of the IGRA to establish
Indian tribes have the right to govern the gaming that takes place on tribal lands. 163
Then the court concluded the IGRA's legislative intent was to codify the Cabazon H
distinction between prohibited and regulated activities. 164 The court then determined
Connecticut regulates, rather than prohibits, class III gaming since its policy is to allow
those types of games to take place on occasion. 16 5 Because Connecticut "permits such
gaming," albeit occasionally, it is not against state policy for class III gaming to take
place. 16 6 Since the tribe governs gaming on tribal lands and class III gaming is not
prohibited, the tribe should be able to offer class III gaming at a casino as a revenue-
generating enterprise. 167 The court ordered the State to negotiate with the tribe in good
faith. 168 This opinion suggests the tribe and State might negotiate over any class III
game whether or not the State specifically allows the particular game. 169 The Lac du
Flambeau Band court continued this analysis; it ruled that if the State's policy allows for
any class III gaming, the State must negotiate with the tribe over any class III game even
if the State does not expressly allow it under any other circumstance. 170
Subsequent to the Second Circuit's and Wisconsin district court's decisions, the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits considered the issue of what "permits such gaming" entails. 17 1
Unlike the Second Circuit's and Western District of Wisconsin's broad interpretations,
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits defined "permits such gaming" much more narrowly and
adopted the "game-specific" approach. 172 If a jurisdiction adopts the "game-specific"
approach, the State must only negotiate with the tribe over games the State expressly
159. Id. at 487 (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe I1, 913 F.2d at 1024).
160. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. at488.
163. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1029.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1031.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1032.
168. MashantucketPequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1032.
169. Id. ("This ruling means only that the State must negotiate with the Tribe concerning the conduct of
casino-type games of chance at the Reservation. We necessarily leave to those negotiations the determination
whether and to what extent the regulatory framework under which such games of chance are currently
permitted in the State shall apply on the Reservation.").
170. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 488.
171. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278-80; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1255-59.
172. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 279; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258.
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allows. 173
The first appellate court to adopt this approach was the Eighth Circuit in Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota.174 In this case, the tribe sued the State for failure to
negotiate in good faith under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i). 175  The tribe sought an
injunction "order[ing] the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude ... a compact within a
60-day period"' 176 pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). 177
South Dakota offers the following types of class III gaming: "[L]otteries, video
lottery, limited card games, slot machines, parimutuel horse and dog racing, and
simulcasting." 178  Prior to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's request to enter into
negotiations to execute a tribal-state compact allowing class III gaming, the State had
formed tribal-state compacts with six of the nine federally recognized tribes residing in
South Dakota. 179 South Dakota executed its first tribal-state compact in 1990 with the
Flandreau Santee Tribe. 180  South Dakota used this compact as the "model" for all
subsequent tribal-state compacts.181
The State and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe held "five 'official' negotiations,"
and the tribe and the governor of South Dakota met on three separate occasions. 182 In
these negotiations, the State "adopted a 'rigid' negotiation strategy by offering the tribe
the so-called 'Flandreau compact."'"183  The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe sought to
include games not included in the "Flandreau compact,"'184 higher wagering limits, and
173. See e.g. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe t, 3 F.3d at 279; Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258.
174. 3 F.3d 273.
175. Id. at 276; see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. S.D., 830 F. Supp. 523, 524 (D.S.D. 1993)
[hereinafter Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 1].
176. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
177. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe If, 3 F.3d at 276; see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 1, 830 F. Supp. at
524.
178. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe II, 3 F.3d at 276.
179. Id. Those six tribes are the Flandreau Santee Tribe, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, the Yankton
Sioux Tribe, the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.
The historic community of Deadwood, South Dakota, also offers class III gaming though this is not tribal
gaming, so it is not regulated by a tribal-state compact. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at277.
182. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe I1, 3 F.3d at 276.
183. Id. (footnote omitted).
184. The court describes the "Flandreau compact" as:
A. The Tribe is allowed initially to operate 180 gaming devices to be split at the Tribe's choice
between slot machines, poker tables and blackjack tables.
B. If the Tribe can demonstrate that their devices average at least $63.75 per day of play, then they
are entitled to add an additional 70 devices, bringing the total to 250 devices.
C. The blackjack and poker games and the slot machines are to be operated in accordance with state
regulations covering pot and bet limits, payout limits and hours of operation.
D. The State conducts background investigations for all potential tribal gaming operators. These
persons must meet state licensing requirements. An arbitrations procedure may be invoked to
handle licensing disputes.
E. The Flandreau Tribal Gaming Commission handles discipline of licensees. However, there is
oversight by the executive director of the State Gaming Commission. The executive director has
the ability to require the Tribal Gaming Commission to impose greater penalties in discipline
situations if he/she believes that the penalties imposed by the Tribe are not severe enough.
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"gaming sites on commercially valuable Indian trust lands located near Fort Pierre and
Pluma." 185  The State refused to negotiate on these terms unless the tribe granted the
state certain concessions. 186 The tribe refused these concessions and sued the State for
failure to negotiate in good faith. 
187
At the district court, the tribe argued the "Flandreau compact" was unreasonable
for its needs and it was entitled to a different kind of compact than the Flandreau Tribe
negotiated with the State. 188 The tribe's rationale was it is larger in population and area
than the other tribes, it is located in a remote area, and it "has a mature tribal
government, including tribal police and tribal courts." 189  However, the district court
rejected the tribe's arguments and refused to grant summary judgment for either the tribe
or the State. 190  The district court determined the State did negotiate in good faith
because South Dakota law sets bet limits and only allows for video keno. 191 The court
denied summary judgment because a material fact question remained concerning
whether the operation of the gaming off the tribe's reservation lands in Fort Pierre and
Pluma met the requirements of the IGRA. 192  Both the State and tribe appealed the
district court's judgment. 193
The tribe specifically wanted to offer traditional keno as part of its class III gaming
venture. 194 It argued that because the State permits video keno and also allows charities
F. If state bet limits are increased or decreased, the Tribe's bet limits are increased or decreased
automatically.
G. If the State authorizes new or different games, the Tribe is entitled upon amendment of the
compact to offer such games.
H. The 180 gaming devices authorized by the compact is based upon twice the number that one
individual can control in Deadwood. If the maximum gaming device numbers for individuals in
Deadwood is increased or decreased, then the Flandreau Tribe is entitled automatically to a
proportional increase or decrease in authorized device numbers.
I. The compact also deals with civil and criminal jurisdiction related to gaming. The jurisdiction is
basically agreed to be as follows:
Tribal member criminal defendants will be proceeded against in federal or tribal court. All others
will be proceeded against in state court except consistent with State v. Larson, 455 N.W.2d 600
(S.D. 1990). Civilly, disputes between tribal members will be heard in tribal court. If either party
to the dispute is not a tribal member, the case will be heard in state court unless the parties stipulate
the case to be heard in tribal court. Tribal sovereign immunity is not waived.
Id. at 276-77 n. 4.
185. Id. at 277. The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's reservation "is located in a remote western part of the
state, far from population centers, which are located in the southeastern comer of the state." Id. Fort Pierre
and Pluma are not on, nor near the tribe's reservation lands. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278 n. 5.
186. Id. at 277 (One example of such a concession is expanded state criminal jurisdiction.).
187. Id. at 276.
188. Id. at 277.
189. Id.
190. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278.
191. Id. at 277 (The tribe wanted to offer traditional keno as part of its class III gaming enterprise, but the
State refused to negotiate over traditional keno.).
192. Id. at 277-78 (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 1, 830 F. Supp. at 525-26); see also 25 U.S.C. §
2703(4) (defining "Indian lands").
193. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278.
194. Id. at 277.
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to operate "casino-type games such as craps and blackjack"'19 5 at "Las Vegas" nights, the
tribe should be allowed to operate "similar casino-type gambling and traditional
keno." 196 The State countered that traditional keno is fundamentally different than video
keno, and it would be unfair to allow the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe to offer the
traditional form since the other tribes offering class III gaming were not able to offer
it.19 7 The State also alleged charities may only legally operate bingo and raffles.
198
The court agreed with the State that "[t]he 'such gaming' language of 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B) does not require the state to negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it
does not presently permit." 199 The court used a similar rationale with regards to whether
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could operate games with higher bet limits, concluding
the State did not need to negotiate with the tribe concerning this since the State expressly
allowed for a bet limit of five dollars.
200
The Ninth Circuit also adopted a "game-specific" approach to interpreting "permits
such gaming" in Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson.2 01 In this case,
seven tribes20 2 sued the governor of California because the State refused to negotiate
with the tribes in the compacting process over the inclusion of three types of class III
gaming-stand-alone electronic gaming devices, live banking card games, and live
percentage card games.
20 3
California law allows for some class III gaming, namely "video lottery terminals,
parimutuel horse racing, and nonbanked, nonpercentage card gam[es]." 2 04  However,
California law prohibits live banking and percentage card games as well as slot machines
as misdemeanor offenses.205  Therefore, whether California would be obligated to
negotiate with the tribes over the inclusion of these games in the tribal-state compact
hinges on the interpretation of the phrase "permits such gaming" as found in 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B).20 6
The State argued that because the proposed gaming activities are illegal under
State law, 207 the IGRA does not obligate California to negotiate with tribes.20 8 This
195. Id. at 278.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 278-79.
199. Id. at 279.
200. Id.
201. 64 F.3d 1250.
202. Id. at 1255. The seven tribes included: (1) the Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians; (2) Table
Mountain Rancheria; (3) Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the Trinidad Rancheria; (4) San Manual Band
of Mission Indians, Viejas Reservation of the Capitan Grande Band of Diegueno Mission Indians and Hopland
Band of Pomo Indians; (5) Barona Band of Mission Indians; (6) Sycuan Band of Mission Indians; and (7) Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians. Id at 1250-51. Other complaining tribes joined in the appeal. Id. at 1255.
203. Id. (footnotes omitted).
204. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1256.
205. ld. (citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 330, 330a, & 330b).
206. See id.
207. In Score Family Fun Center, Inc. v. Co. of San Diego, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1217 (1990), the California
appellate court "indicated that electronic machines of the sort requested by the Tribes fall within the scope of
[the] prohibition" in Cal. Penal Code §§ 330a and 330b. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1256.
208. Id.
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argument follows the "game-specific" approach. 20 9 The tribes argued that because the
State offers some class III gaming, its policy is to regulate class III gaming in general as
a matter of public policy. 2 10 This argument follows the "categorical" approach. 2 11 The
tribes cited to Cabazon II and emphasized that decision's shorthand test for determining
whether the state regulates or prohibits an activity such as gaming is whether "the
conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.
' 2 12
The court rejected the tribes' broad reading of the IGRA in favor of the State's
more narrow interpretation.2 13  The court rationalized this decision using "[their]
traditional tools of statutory construction." 2 14 The court determined because the IGRA's
language was not ambiguous, the plain meaning would be conclusive in its
interpretation.2 15  Because of this, the court did not consider the legislative history
surrounding the IGRA, nor the canon of construction dictating that courts should read
statutes affecting Native Americans liberally in the Native Americans' favor.
2 16
In its interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), the court focused on the
definition of "permit. ' 2 17  The Ninth Circuit had previously adopted the "dictionary
definition of the term permit as meaning [t]o suffer, allow, consent, let; to give leave or
license; to acquiesce, by failure to prevent, or to expressly assent or agree to the doing of
an act."2 18 The court used this definition to decide that California did not permit the
tribes' proposed gaming activities.
219
The court did acknowledge the senate report accompanying the passage of the
IGRA interpreted the term "permit" differently, but pointed out this was only in
connection with the discussion of class II gaming. 220  The tribes relied on this Senate
report to urge the court to accept that Congress intended to implement the Cabazon II
distinction between prohibited and regulated activities in defining "permits such gaming"
for both class II and class III gaming. 221 The court agreed with the tribes' argument with
respect to class II gaming, but it rejected the argument with respect to class III
gaming.
2 22
The Second Circuit, in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, also recognized Congress's
stated intent to implement the Cabazon II distinction in the IGRA with respect to class II
209. See generally N. Arapaho, 389 F.3dat 1311.
210. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1256.
211. See generally N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311.
212. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989)
("Interpretation of a statute must begin with the statute's language.")); U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235,
242 (1989) ("The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which) the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."').
216. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 632 (9th Cir.
1988)).
217. Id. at 1258-59.
218. Id. at 1257 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984)).
219. Id. at 1257-58.
220. Id. at 1259 (quoting Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076)).
221. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1259.
222. Id.
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gaming but, unlike the Ninth Circuit, extended the distinction to class III gaming.22 3
The Second Circuit extended the distinction to class III gaming because it compared the
language of the two sections in the IGRA and found them to be nearly identical. 224 The
Second Circuit implemented the principle of statutory construction prescribing "' [w]hen
the same word or phrase is used in the same section of an act more than once, and the
meaning is clear as used in one place, it will be construed to have the same meaning in
the next place.'
225
The Ninth Circuit rejected this principle of statutory construction with respect to
25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(1)(A) and 2710(d)(1)(B).2 26 Instead, the court stated "'[i]dentical
words appearing more than once in the same act, and even in the same section, may be
construed differently if it appears they were used in different places with different
intent."' 22 7 The court found this to be the case with respect to these two sections of the
IGRA because the Senate Report was silent with regards to the Cabazon I analysis and
class III gaming, and because the court determined "Congress envisioned different roles
for Class II and Class III gaming.
' 228
The court further supported its decision by analogizing to Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe II and agreeing with the approach the Eighth Circuit adopted-the "game-specific"
approach.229 The court in Rumsey Indian Rancheria concluded "a state need only allow
Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what
others cannot have."
2 30
III. "PERMITS SUCH GAMING" AND THE "CATEGORICAL" APPROACH
The proper interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)'s "permits such gaming" is
the "categorical" approach which is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute and
conforms more to the legislative intent.2 31 In addition, using the "categorical" approach
to interpret this section comports with the canon of Indian law construction that provides
223. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1030.
224. Id. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(l)(A) states that class II gaming is allowed on Indian lands if "such
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization
or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian lands by federal law)." Id.
(emphasis added). Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) states that class III gaming is allowed on Indian lands if
"such activities are.., located in a State that permits such gaming. for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity." Id. (emphasis added).
225. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Nunez, 573 F.2d at 771).
226. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1259. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Second
Circuit came to the correct conclusion in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, but it disagreed with the Second
Circuit's "use of the Class II legislative history to interpret IGRA's Class III provisions." Id. at 1259 n. 5.
227. Id. at 1259 (quoting Vanscoter v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1990)).
228. Id. (citing Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. U.S., 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) for the expressio unius
principle). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include
one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary 620 (Bryan A.
Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
229. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258.
230. Id. (footnote omitted). The Tribes petitioned for an en banc rehearing. Id. at 1252. The Ninth Circuit
denied this request over a vigorous dissent. Id. at 1252-55 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting).
231. See Sen. Rpt. 100-446 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3071-72).
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for resolution favoring the tribe when there is ambiguity in a statute.23 2 Finally, this
approach allows for more tribal autonomy, in line with one of the stated purposes of
enacting the IGRA--"to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments."
233
A. Using Plain Meaning to Interpret "Permits Such Gaming"
Plain meaning is "[t]he meaning attributed to a document ... by giving the words
their ordinary sense, without referring to extrinsic indications of the author's intent."
2 34
The plain-meaning rule is "[t]he rule that if a writing, or a provision in a writing, appears
to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the writing itself
without resort to any extrinsic evidence." 235 In support of the plain-meaning rule, the
Supreme Court has reiterated many times "[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself.",236  The language of 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B) states "[c]lass III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are.., located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity." 23 7 The language in question is "permits such gaming."
The ordinary-meaning rule is "[t]he rule that when a word is not defined in a
statute or other legal instrument, the court normally construes it in accordance with its
ordinary or natural meaning." 238  Because Congress did not include "permit" in the
IGRA's definitions, 239 the Lac du Flambeau Band and Rumsey Indian Rancheria courts
looked to the dictionary definition of "permits.' 24°  In Lac du Flambeau Band, the
district court focused on Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "permit" as "[t]o suffer,
allow, consent, let; to give leave or license; to acquiesce by failure to prevent, or to
expressly assent or agree to the doing of an act." 24 1 In Rumsey Indian Rancheria, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the same dictionary definition of "permit."242 Using the same
definition of "permit," the Lac du Flambeau Band court and the Rumsey Indian
232. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians § 2 (2005). See also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392 (quoting Alaska P. Fisheries v.
U.S., 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)); Antoine v. Wash., 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975).
233. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (emphasis added).
234. Black's Law Dictionary at 1002.
235. Id. at 1188.
236. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, Stewart & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring). See also Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 302 (1993)
(Thomas, Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976)); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756); Rumsey Indian
Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257 ("'Interpretation of a statute must begin with the statute's language."') (quoting
Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300)).
237. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
238. Black's Law Dictionary at 1132.
239. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703.
240. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257; Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 484-85.
241. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (Joseph R. Nolan &
M.J. Connolly eds., 5th ed., West 1979)). The court used the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary. The
eighth edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines "permit" as (1) "(t]o consent to formally," (2) "[t]o give
opportunity for," and (3) "[t]o allow or admit of." Black's Law Dictionary at 1176.
242. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257. In this case, the Ninth Circuit, like the Western District
Court of Wisconsin in Lac du Flambeau Band, used the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary. Id
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Rancheria court came to opposite conclusions: The Western District Court in Lac du
Flambeau adopted the "categorical" approach, and the Ninth Circuit in Rumsey Indian
Rancheria adopted the "game-specific" approach.2 43
Because the definition of "permit" is not the decisive factor in determining whether
to take the "categorical" or "game-specific" approach, it is necessary to look at "such
gaming. ' 244 The dictionary definition of "such" is "of the character, quality, or extent
previously indicated or implied; of the same class, type, or sort." 2 4 5 The "previously
indicated" gaming in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) is class III gaming in general, not one
particular class III game. 24 6 To interpret "such gaming" in "[c]lass III gaming activities
shall be lawful ... if such activities are ... located in a State that permits such
gaming''247 as referring to only a specific class III game "is not a natural reading of the
statutory language.' 24 8 Instead, the natural reading is to read "such gaming" as referring
to class III gaming in general. Class III gaming in general is "of the same class, type, or
sort"2 4 9 to which the statute's language, "such gaming" refers.
In further support of this contention is the fact that Congress used "such" earlier in
the statute to describe "activities" in referring back to class III gaming activities. 25  "A
standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases
within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning." 25 1 Because "such
activities" clearly refers to class III gaming in general, "such gaming" must also refer to
class III gaming in general.
An example will help illustrate this point. Tribe A wants to offer roulette, craps,
and poker (all class III games) at its Indian Casino. It requests State B enter into
negotiations with it to form a compact so it might begin operating these games. State B
allows for charitable organizations to offer roulette and poker at "Las Vegas nights" to
raise funds, but State B does not allow charitable organizations to offer craps at these
fundraising events. Additionally, State B operates a state lottery and provides for pari-
243. Id. at 1258, 1260; Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485, 488.
244. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting).
245. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1247 (11 th ed., Merriam-Webster 2006).
246. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting).
The only natural reading of section 2710(d)(1)(B) is that, when Congress says "Class III gaming
activities shall be lawful ... if located in a State that permits such gaming," then "such gaming"
refers back to the category of "Class III gaming," which is the next prior use of the word "gaming."
[The majority opinion in Rumsey Indian Rancheria] interprets the statutory language as if it said: "A
Class III game shall be lawful ... if located in a State that permits that game." But that is not what
Congress said, and it is not a natural reading of the statutory language. The plain language cuts
directly against [the majority opinion]; Congress allows a tribe to conduct Class III gaming
activities (pursuant to a compact) if the State allows Class III gaming by anyone.
Id.
247. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
248. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., dissenting).
249. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1247.
250. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) ("Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such
activities are ... located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or
entity.") (emphasis added).
251. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2007) (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,
546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005)).
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mutuel wagering at greyhound and horse races. State B permits class III gaming in
general by allowing for roulette, poker, a lottery, and pari-mutuel wagering. Under the
plain meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), State B should negotiate with Tribe A over
the offering of craps in addition to roulette and poker.2 52 This is because craps is a class
III gaming activity and class III gaming activities are lawful in State B because State B
"permits such gaming" by allowing for other class III gaming activities. 253
Thus, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) is facially unambiguous. The plain meaning of
the statute's language supports a "categorical" approach to interpreting "permits such
gaming."
B. Using Legislative Intent to Interpret "Permits Such Gaming"
Although the starting point of any statutory construction begins with the plain
meaning of the statute's language, the plain meaning is not necessarily the concluding
point also.2 5 4 The plain meaning will not be conclusive where "the literal application of
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters."
2 5 5
Therefore, if a court encounters the issue of interpreting "permits such gaming," and
finds the plain meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2710 supports a finding for a "game-specific"
approach, the court should still look to the legislative history of the IGRA. Using a
"game-specific" approach is the opposite of what Congress intended, as evidenced by
Senate Report 100-446 (Report).
2 56
The Report begins by noting the reasons for adopting federal legislation that will
place limitations on tribal sovereignty.2 5 7 The States and the U.S. Department of Justice
repeatedly "expressed concem over the potential for the infiltration of organized crime or
criminal elements in Indian gaming activities." 2 5 8  However, if this is the reason for
252. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting). Circuit Judge Canby argues that "[t]he structure of IGRA makes clear that Congress was dealing
categorically, and that a state's duty to bargain is not to be determined game-by-game. The time to argue over
particular games is during the negotiation process." Id.
253. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(B).
254. See e.g. Fed. Trade Commn., 312 U.S. at 350 ("While one may not end with the words of a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there.").
255. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 243). See also Holy
Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and
the Reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the
judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include
the particular act.
Id.
256. See generally Sen. Rpt. 100-446 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071). A House Report was not
submitted with the IGRA. Id. at 1.
257. Id. at 1-2 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3071-72) ("The need for Federal and/or State regulation
of gaming, in addition to, or instead of, tribal regulation, has been expressed by various State and Federal law
enforcement officials out of fear that Indian bingo and other gambling enterprises may become targets for
infiltration by criminal elements.").
258. Id. at 5 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075). However, Senator John McCain expressed doubts
whether this was a viable concern since "in 15 years of gaming activity on Indian reservations there has never
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regulating Indian gaming, there is no rational purpose for adopting the "game-specific"
approach over a "categorical" approach. For example, in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11,
there would have been no more risk of criminal infiltration if the tribe had been allowed
to offer traditional keno in addition to video keno. 259 Likewise, using the example with
Tribe A and State B above, State B would experience no more likelihood of "infiltration
of organized crime or criminal elements ' 26° were Tribe A to offer craps, roulette, and
poker instead of just roulette and poker.
Although deciding to regulate Indian gaming, the Report does point out there is a
"strong Federal interest in preserving the sovereign rights of tribal governments to
regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian land."2 61 In noting this, the Report also
explains states have only been able to regulate Indian affairs if Congress expressly grants
them the power to do so. 2 6 2 Usually, if Congress limits tribal sovereignty, it does so
through federal grants of authority. 263 However, at least with respect to class III gaming,
Congress granted regulatory power to the states via the compacting process. 264  The
Report explains this is due to the fact that state agencies are already in effect and have
"the expertise to regulate gaming activities and to enforce laws related to gaming.
265
Because state agencies with this expertise already existed and because no such agency
existed at the federal level, Congress found there was no need for duplication.
266
Additionally, the Report explains "the use of compacts between tribes and states is the
best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect
to the regulation of complex gaming enterprises such as parimutuel horse and dog racing,
casino gaming, jai alai and so forth."2
6 7
However, Congress, in its delegation of power to the states, intended this grant of
power to be very limited and did not intend the states to extend their jurisdiction or apply
their other laws to the tribe. 268 The Report states that Congress "does not intend that
been one clearly proven case of organized criminal activity." Id. at 33 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3103) (additional views of John McCain). Instead, Senator McCain implies the real reason States have
expressed such an interest in the regulation of gaming is that they fear economic competition with their own
gaming interests. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 33 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3103). He states, "the State and
gaming industry have always come to the table with the position that what is theirs is theirs and what the Tribe
[sic] have is negotiable." Id.
259. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 11, 3 F.3d at 277.
260. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 5 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
265. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 5 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 13 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083) ("[T]he compact process is a viable mechanism for
setting [sic] various matters between two equal sovereigns.").
268. Id. at 6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076) ("In no instance, does [the IGRA] contemplate the
extension of State jurisdiction or the application of State laws for any other purpose."). See also id. at 35
(reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3104-O5) (additional views of Daniel J. Evans). Applying a Cabazon H
analysis, Mr. Evans writes
Public Law 280 only subjected the actions of individual Indians to State enforcement. Public Law
[280] did not subject the governing processes of the tribes to State law and public policy constraints,
which would be a fundamental derogation of tribal self-government. Likewise, [the IGRA] should
be construed not to subject tribal governance to State court jurisdiction.
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compacts be used as a subterfuge for imposing State jurisdiction on tribal lands." 269
Assistant Attorney General, John R. Bolton, writing on behalf of the U.S. Department of
Justice, included in the Report his opposition of enacting the IGRA. 270 As an opponent
to Congress enacting the IGRA, he recognized the IGRA, in its very limited grant of
authority to the states, "would clearly empower the tribes to run most casino games and
arguably all of them. Lumping together bingo and card games would allow the tribes to
run blackjack--one of the most common casino games-and poker in a State that
allowed only charitable bingo."
27 1
From this intent of not subjecting tribes to all state laws, it follows that the
"categorical" approach is what Congress had in mind in drafting the IGRA. 272
Implementing the "game-specific" approach would allow states to apply their laws to the
tribe and force the tribe to adhere to those laws in only offering those class III games the
state offers. This is directly contrary to Congress's stated intent.273  Instead, the
"categorical" approach allows all class III gaming if the State has no public policy
against class III gaming. 274 If the State allows any class III gaming, class III gaming is
not contrary to the State's public policy. 275 At this point, the tribe can decide what class
III games to offer without reference to the State's laws. To further illustrate this point,
please refer to the example above with Tribe A and State B. Because State B allows for
some class III gaming (poker, roulette, pari-mutuel wagering, and a lottery), class III
gaming is not against State B's public policy. Thus, Tribe A should be able to offer
craps at its casino in addition to poker and roulette. State B should not be able to apply
its law whether specifically prohibiting craps or not on the sovereign tribe's lands.
There is a resolution for State B if it absolutely wants to prohibit craps and for Mr.
Bolton's acknowledgement that a state may have to allow a tribe to offer games the state
wants to prohibit.276  That resolution lies in the negotiations to form a tribal-state
compact. 277 The IGRA does not prohibit a state from making concessions to a tribe,
during the negotiations for a compact, to encourage the tribe not to offer a particular
game.2 78 Indeed, this is exactly what the IGRA contemplates a state would do if the
Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 35 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105). See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, 913
F.2d at 1030. The Second Circuit rejected Connecticut's argument "that class III gaming should be subjected
to the full corpus of state laws and regulations with regard to gambling." Id. at 1031.
269. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 14 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3084).
270. Id. at 22-32 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3092-3102).
271. Id. at 24 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3094). Mr. Bolton's statement, however, is incorrect with
regards to allowing blackjack and poker in a state permitting only charitable bingo since blackjack and poker
are class III games, and bingo is a class II game. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7). The point is that tribes can offer
even those games that the State does not as long as the State offers some form of class III gaming. Sen. Rpt.
100-446 at 24 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3094).
272. Id. at 6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076) ("In no instance, does [the IGRA] contemplate the
extension of State jurisdiction or the application of State laws for any other purpose.").
273. Id.
274. See Cabazon 11,480 U.S. at210-11.
275. See id
276. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting) ("The time to argue over particular games is during the negotiation process.").
277. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). See also Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254; Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1030.
278. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1254; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, 913 F.2d at
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tribe seeks to offer particular class III gaming the state wishes to prohibit.
279
This contemplation does not come into effect under a "game-specific" approach;
under that approach, the State only needs to negotiate with the tribe over games the State
currently allows. 280 The "game-specific" approach would cause the IGRA's compacting
process to "become a dead letter; there would be nothing to negotiate, and no meaningful
compact would be possible. ' 281  Instead, directly contrary to the Report's stated
intentions, the state would be able to apply its "full corpus of state laws and regulations
with regard to gambling" to a sovereign tribe's operations.2 82 This would not be the
result under the "categorical" approach. Instead, the "categorical" approach would fully
implement the IGRA's contemplation that states and tribes would negotiate over specific
games' prohibition or allowance during the compacting process after determining class
III gaming in general is not against the state's policy. Thus, using the example above, it
is at the negotiations stage where State B could make concessions to encourage Tribe A
to not offer craps. On the other hand, Tribe A could make concessions to encourage
State B to allow the tribe to offer craps. This approach gives full effect to Congress's
implementation of the compacting process contained in the IGRA.
283
Also giving more effect to Congress's intent in enacting the IGRA is to consider
the definition of "permit" in light of the Supreme Court's use of that word in Cabazon
H.284 In Cabazon 11, the Supreme Court used "permit" as meaning "allow" in
concluding California generally permitted or allowed gaming. 285 The Report refers to
Cabazon 11 no fewer than fourteen times, indicating how important this case was in the
consideration behind the enactment of the IGRA.
286
In support of the Cabazon 11 decision, the Report states Congress "anticipates that
Federal courts will rely on the distinction between State criminal laws which prohibit
certain activities and the civil laws of a State which impose a regulatory scheme upon
those activities to determine whether class II games are allowed in certain States."
287
1030 ("[T]he interests of the tribe and state are to be reconciled through the negotiation of a compact.").
279. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1253 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) and 18 U.S.C. §
1 166(c)(2)).
IGRA's otherwise drastic extension of state gaming law to Indian country (to be enforced only by
the federal government) was modified by IGRA's process by which the states and tribes could
arrive at compacts specifying what games might be allowed and who might have jurisdiction to
enforce gaming laws.... The whole idea was to foster these compacts. That goal is defeated if the
details of the state's regulatory schemes, allowing some games and prohibiting others, apply if the
state does nothing.
Id.
280. See e.g. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe I1, 913 F.2d at 1030.
281. Id. at 1031.
282. Id.
283. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3); Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 5-6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075-76).
284. See Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
285. Cabazon II, 480 U.S. at 209-10.
286. See Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 2-4, 6, 9, 23, 24, 35, 36 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3072, 3073, 2074,
3076, 3079, 3093, 3094, 3104, 3105). See also id. at 35 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3104) (additional
views of Daniel J. Evans) (The IGRA "should be considered within the line of developed case law extending
over a century and a half by the United States Supreme Court, including the basic principles set forth in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.").
287. Id. at 6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076).
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Additionally, the Report notes the phrase "for any purpose by any person, organization
or entity"288 does not distinguish "between State laws that allow class II gaming for
charitable, commercial, or governmental purposes, or the nature of the entity conducting
the gaming. If such gaming is not criminally prohibited by the State in which tribes are
located, then tribes, as governments are free to engage in such gaming. '
289
While the report refers specifically to class II games here, the courts should apply
the same distinction to determine whether the State allows class III games. 29° This is
because the section of the IGRA regulating class II gaming, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A),
has nearly identical language as the section of the IGRA regulating class III gaming, 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). 29 1 Section 2710(b)(1)(A) states class II gaming is allowed on
Indian lands if "such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming
for any purpose by any person, organization or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise
specifically prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law). ' 292 Section 2710(d)(1)(B) states
class III gaming is allowed on Indian lands if "such activities are ... located in a State
that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.' 29 3 It
is a normal rule of statutory construction "that '[w]hen the same word or phrase is used
in the same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear as used in one
place, it will be construed to have the same meaning in the next place.' 294
Even courts applying the "game-specific" approach to class III gaming have
respected Congress's intent with regard to class II gaming. 295 This result is in discord
with both Congress's intent as evidenced by the Report and with the previously
mentioned rule of statutory construction. Both congressional intent and this rule of
statutory construction require a "categorical" approach to interpret "permits such
gaming.
296
C. Using the Canon of Indian Law Construction to Benefit Tribes in Cases of
Statutory Ambiguity to Interpret "Permits Such Gaming"
When Congress passes legislation relating to Tribes, courts should liberally
construe the statutes in order to benefit the Tribes.29 7 This is especially so when a
288. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(1)(A), 2710(d)(1)(B).
289. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 12 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3082).
290. See Mashantueket Pequot Tribe I1, 913 F.2d at 1030.
291. See id See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(1)(A), 2710 (d)(1)(B).
292. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(l)(A) (emphasis added).
293. Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
294. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Nunez, 573 F.2d at 771). See also Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329-30 (2000) (citing Natl. Credit Union Admin. v. First Natl. Bank &
Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501 (1998); Bankamerica Corp. v. U.S., 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983)).
295. Compare e.g. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258 with Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v.
Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 538 (1994). In Rumsey Indian Rancheria, the Ninth Circuit adopted the "game-specific"
approach with regards to class III gaming. 64 F.3d at 1258. In Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the "categorical" approach with regards to class II gaming. 54 F.3d at 538.
296. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe If, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Nunez, 573 F.2d at 771). See generally
Sen. Rpt. 100-446 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071).
297. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians § 2. See also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392 (quoting Alaska P. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at
89).
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statute is ambiguous. 298 The Report recognizes that issues over courts' interpretation of
the IGRA will arise.299 The Report states Congress "trusts that courts will interpret any
ambiguities on these issues in a manner that will be most favorable to tribal interests
consistent with the legal standard used by courts for over 150 years in deciding cases
involving Indian tribes. ' 3° °  Thus, a court should adopt a "categorical" approach in
interpreting "permits such gaming."
Black's Law Dictionary defines "ambiguity" as "[a]n uncertainty of meaning or
intention, as in a... statutory provision." 30 1 As demonstrated above, courts relying on
the definition of "permits" come to opposite conclusions with some adopting a
"categorical" approach and some adopting a "game-specific" approach, evidencing an
ambiguity in interpretation.30 2 Additionally, some courts have found the plain meaning
to be sufficient to interpret "permits such gaming" while others have found the need to
resort to legislative intent, further confirming ambiguity in interpretation.
3 °3
Furthermore, the Second Circuit applied the principle of statutory construction "that
'[w]hen the same word or phrase is used in the same section of an act more than once,
and the meaning is clear as used in one place, it will be construed to have the same
meaning in the next place."' 30 4  However, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this
stating "'[i]dentical words appearing more than once in the same act, and even in the
same section, may be construed differently if it appears they were used in different
places with different intent."
'30 5
These examples demonstrate "permits such gaming" is ambiguous. Because of
this ambiguity, courts should rely on the canon of statutory construction providing for
resolution favoring the tribes. The resolution most beneficial for the tribes is the
adoption of the "categorical" approach. This retains more sovereignty for the tribes and
allows them to offer a wider variety of class III gaming.
298. Id.
299. Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 15 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3085).
300. Id. at 15 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3085).
301. Black's Law Dictionary at 88.
In the context of statutory interpretation the word most frequently used to indicate the doubt which a
judge must entertain before he can search for and, if possible, apply a secondary meaning is
"ambiguity." In ordinary language this term is often confined to situations in which the same word
is capable of meaning two different things, but, in relation to statutory interpretation, judicial usage
sanctions the application of the word "ambiguity" to describe any kind of doubtful meaning of
words, phrases or longer statutory provisions. Hinchy's case prompted the suggestion that if, in a
particular context, words convey to different judges a different range of meanings "derived from,
not fanciful speculations or mistakes about linguistic usage, but from true knowledge about the use
of words, they are ambiguous."
Id. (quotidig Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation 76-77 (Butterworths 1976)).
302. Compare e.g. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485, 488 (adopting the "categorical" approach)
with Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258-59 (adopting the "game-specific" approach).
303. Compare e.g. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1029 & Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp.
at 485 (finding need to look to legislative history) with Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258 (finding no
need to look to legislative history). Although the Ninth Circuit stated it had no need to look to legislative
history, it did conduct a brief examination to clarify its decision. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258-
59.
304. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe II, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Nunez, 573 F.2d at 771). See also Reno, 528
U.S. at 329-30 (citing Bankamerica Corp., 462 U.S. at 129; Nal. Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 501).
305. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Vanscoter, 920 F.2d at 1448).
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D. Using a Stated Purpose of the IGRA to Interpret "Permits Such Gaming"
Title 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) declares that one purpose of the IGRA is "to provide a
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.'306 This
is such a necessary goal when viewed in light of the ongoing problems Indian Nations
must confront. 307 When compared to the national average, Indians are more likely to
have higher poverty and unemployment rates, to be a victim of violent crime, to face
more serious health risks, to live in poor housing conditions, and to attain lower
education levels. 30 8 Indian gaming provides for opportunities that were previously non-
309existent to curb this alarming trend. Indeed, many are referring to Indian gaming as
the "new buffalo" because Indian gaming "is a single source capable of feeding and
clothing the Indians. It has become the one economic development program that has
been able to overcome the poor quality and remote location of most of their lands."3 10
In 2006, Indian gaming "generated $25.7 billion in gross tribal government
revenues and created more than 670,000 jobs." 3 11 In the past ten years, Indian gaming
revenue has increased by billions each year.3 12 The biggest contributor to this increase
in revenue has been class III games. 3 13 This increase in revenue generates employment
for tribal members. 314 Additionally, tribes use this revenue that Indian gaming generates
for education, children and elders services, cultural enrichment, charitable donations,
306. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (emphasis added).
307. See NatI. Indian Gaming Assn., The Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2006 32,
http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-releases-2007/NIGA-econ-impact-2006.pdf (accessed Mar. 19,
2008).
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Dunstan, supra n. 87. See also Amy L. Cox, Student Author, The New Buffalo: Tribal Gaming as a
Means of Subsistence under Attack, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 863 (1998); Steven D. Hamilton, Student
Author, Panzer v. Doyle: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Fires a Near Fatal Shot at the New Buffalo, 55 DePaul
L. Rev. 1341 (2006); Amy Head, Student Author, The Death of the New Buffalo: The Fifth Circuit Slays Indian
Gaming in Texas, 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 377 (2003).
311. Natl. Indian Gaming Assn., supra n. 307, at 6. See also Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., supra n. 1
(reporting $25.1 billion in gaming revenue); Dunstan, supra n. 87 ("Although there is agreement that [Indian
gaming] has grown dramatically, it is difficult to put an exact dollar figure on the size of Indian gaming....
Estimates of the gross revenues vary widely.").
312. Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., supra n. 1.
313. Alan Meister, Casino City's Indian Gaming Industry Report, http://www.casinocitypress.com/
IndianGaming/IndianGamingReport! (accessed Mar. 19, 2008) (giving key points from Dr. Meister's report)
("Class III gaming.., generated the lion's share of revenue.").
314. See Natl. Indian Gaming Assn., supra n. 307, at 6. This increase in employment also helped the federal
and state govemments. Id. at 7. The following figures are from a 2006 analysis:
The $22.1 billion in wages generates about $3.4 billion in federal income taxes and just under $3.5
billion in Social Security taxes....
In addition, the federal government saved an additional $1.7 billion in reduced welfare payments
and unemployment benefits....
Indian gaming generated an additional $2.4 billion in revenue for state governments through state
income, payroll, sales and other taxes and direct revenue sharing payments. Indian gaming also
generated an additional $100 million in local taxes and revenue through increased sales and other
taxes and governmental services agreements.
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economic development, health care, police and fire protection, and housing.
3 15
Logically, it follows that the more class III games a tribe can offer, especially if
one cannot play the game elsewhere in the state, equals more economic growth for the
tribe. The "categorical" approach allows a tribe to offer a wider variety of class III
games. In contrast, the "game-specific" approach limits the number of games a tribe can
offer, and under this approach, the tribe can only offer games that are offered elsewhere
in the state. The "categorical" approach is the approach that best reaches the purpose of
the IGRA in "provid[ing] a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as
a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments."
3 16
IV. CONCLUSION
Gaming is a viable and popular way for Indian tribes to generate revenue.3 17 Class
III gaming generates the bulk of that revenue helping to achieve "a principal goal of
Federal Indian policy [which] is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal government."3 18 In order for the tribes to be able to take
full advantage of this revenue-generating tool, courts should adopt the "categorical"
approach to interpret "permits such gaming.
319
Interpreting "permits such gaming" using the "categorical" approach is consistent
with the plain meaning of the statute.3 20 A look at the definition of both "permits" and
"such" leads the interpreter to the result that "permits such gaming" must mean "allows
class III gaming, in general.
'3 21
Additionally, implementing the "categorical" approach to interpret "permits such
gaming" comports with legislative intent.3 22  The Senate Report accompanying the
enactment of the IGRA makes clear that the legislative intent was to allow the tribes as
much autonomy in the gaming industry as possible.323  The "categorical" approach
grants more autonomy to the tribes by better recognizing tribal sovereignty in that tribes
are not subject to all of a state's laws, just the state's policy on matters concerning
gaming. 324 Congress set up the compacting process to allow the state and the tribe to
315. See id at 8-27.
The National Indian Gaming Association's most recent review concerning the use of revenue
generated by Indian gaming revealed that Indian tribes spend net [tribal] government revenue as
follows: 20% of net revenue is used for education, children and elders, culture, charity and other
purposes[;] 19% goes to economic development[;] 17% to health care[;] 17% to police and fire
protection[;] 16% to infrastructure[;] 11% to housing.
Id. at 8.
316. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (emphasis added).
317. Natl. Indian Gaming Commn., supra n. 1.
318. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4).
319. See e.g. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 11, 913 F.2d at 1031-32; Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at
488.
320. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
321. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1176.
322. See generally Sen. Rpt. 100-446 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 5 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075) (There is a "strong Federal interest in preserving the
sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian land.").
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have an equal say in the matter as long as the state did not have a general policy against
gaming.325  If a court adopts the "game-specific" approach, the court takes away any
meaningful effect the compacting process might have. 326  Instead, the courts should
adopt the "categorical" approach to give meaning to the compacting process. 327 Even
opponents of enacting the IGRA recognized the "categorical" approach was the approach
intended by Congress.
328
Also, courts should interpret "permits such gaming" using the "categorical"
approach in order to comply with the canon of Indian law construction that provides for
resolution favoring the tribe when the statute is ambiguous. 329 Although 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B) is not facially ambiguous, courts have come to opposite conclusions in
interpreting "permits such gaming." 330  This result recognizes some ambiguity, thus
triggering this canon of Indian law construction. The "categorical" approach, not the
"game-specific" approach, is the resolution better favoring the tribe.
Finally, the stated purposes of the IGRA demand the "categorical" approach to
interpret "permits such gaming" in order to allow for increased tribal autonomy.33 1 The
"categorical" approach would allow tribes to offer a wider variety and number of games
thus "promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments."
332
Melissa S. Taylor*
325. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). See also Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 5-6 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3075-76).
326. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1253 (Canby, Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
dissenting); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe I, 913 F.2d at 1030-3 1.
327. See id.
328. See Sen. Rpt. 100-446 at 22-32 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3092-3102).
329. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians § 2. See also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392 (quoting Alaska P. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at
89).
330. Compare e.g. Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 485, 488 (adopting the "categorical" approach)
with Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258, 1260 (adopting the "game-specific" approach).
331. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
332. Id.
* The author is a second-year student at The University of Tulsa College of Law. She would like to thank
Professor Bill Rice for the inspiration and guidance during the writing process; her parents, Randy and Carolyn
Shepard, for always encouraging and believing in her; and her husband, Rob Taylor, for his patience, love, and
support.
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